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The importance of economic flows in
assembling the Iraq war coalition
Robert Riegler, Piotr Lis, Mehtap Hisarciklilar
August 29, 2017
Abstract
Economic ties between countries are likely to influence the alignment of
their international policies. This paper investigates whether countries histor-
ical economic ties with the United States and their expectation of changes in
future economic flows had a role in their decision to join the US-led coalition
in Iraq from 2003 onwards. We use data on 115 countries over the period
2003-2009 to estimate panel random effects probit models of war coalition
participation. We measure the intensity of economic ties with three vari-
ables: bilateral trade flows between the partner country and the US as well
as FDI and aid flows from the US to the partner country. Our results suggest
that both good trade relations prior to the conflict and the prospects of their
further improvements increase the willingness of countries to join the coali-
tion. In spite of the anecdotal evidence, we find no empirical evidence that
the dependence on American FDI or aid affected countries decision on Iraq
war participation.
1 Introduction
Economic flows between countries, such as trade, foreign direct investment (FDI)
and foreign aid, can be important determinants of economic growth, job creation
and good international political relations (Bandyopadhyay, Lahiri, and Younas,
2015, Jude and Silaghi, 2016, Nieman, 2016, Pandya, 2016). Thus, the intensity
of economic ties is likely to influence the alignment of international policies, e.g.
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countries’ decisions to support other states in international ventures, including
military campaigns (Newnham, 2008).
This paper investigates whether previous economic ties with the United States
(US) and the expectation of changes in bilateral economic flows influenced the
probability of countries to join the US-led coalition in Iraq from 2003 onwards.
Since the legitimacy of the war was not confirmed by the United Nations (UN),
the US were likely to resort to using different tools to convince partners of shared
interests and the benefits of war participation. These benefits, either of economic
or political nature, were likely to be needed in order for the leaders of contributing
nations to convince their electorates to accept sending troops in support of the US-
led campaign.
There is rich literature on theory of alliances in political economy (e.g. Kim-
ball, 2006, Sprecher and Krause, 2006, Berkok, 2013, Arvanitidis, Kollias, and
Messis, 2017), but less has been published on formation of ad-hoc war coalitions
assembled for reasons other than reducing immediate and shared threats. Further-
more, the role of economic ties between countries at the coalition building stage is
not well understood as the focus in the literature is placed on political factors. This
is an oversight because one would expect economic factors to play a significant
role; a potential coalition member may want to maintain an amicable relationship
with a coalition leader who might be an important economic partner, ensure this
partner of loyalty, maintain or boost economic ties, and in some cases avoid neg-
ative sanctions. This paper contributes to the literature by testing empirically the
role of economic ties in states’ decisions to join military coalitions.
2 Previous work
The discussion to date has been concentrated on political aspects of international
relations in coalition building, while the economic factors have been largely ne-
glected. Following Tago (2007), factors affecting incentives and disincentives
for joining war coalitions can be divided into four groups: (i) system-level, (ii)
dyad-level, (iii) state-level and (iv) operation-level. The first group relates to the
relative power positions of countries and how they may shape benefits for second-
tier states. The incentives of joining a coalition are positively influenced by a
country’s military capability, its major power status, colonial ties and geographic
proximity to the theatre of war (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004, Tago, 2007, Vucetic,
2011, Corbetta, Volgy, and Rhamey, 2013).
The second group, the dyad-level factors, looks at similarities of cultural na-
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ture, which may give rise to common interests and thus augment the incentives
to join a war coalition (Tago, 2007). The state-level factors refer to internal con-
ditions within a potential coalition member, in particular its own security status,
stability and involvement in internal or external disputes. A country facing severe
security challenges of its own may be either constrained in contributing forces to
a multinational coalition or willing to send a small contingent of troops to secure
future economic or military aid from the US.
The operation-level category concerns the purpose and legitimacy of a coali-
tion which are crucial for both persuading potential coalition member’s domestic
audience and assuring participation in the campaign (Tago, 2007, Vucetic, 2011).
The US made numerous attempts to obtain the UN approval for the invasion of
Iraq; having failed to secure it, far-going efforts were made to persuade wider
international audiences of the war legitimacy (Breslow, 2016).
Most studies ignore economic interests of potential coalition participants. One
of the few exceptions is a qualitative study by Newnham (2008) which presents an
extensive review of examples of economic incentives in the form of economic and
military aid, trade deals or sanctions, and investment used by the US to convince
other states to join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq to build the perception
of international legitimacy for the mission. He concludes that side payments to
states joining a coalition as well as threats of sanctions towards reluctant states
can be an effective tool in assembling coalitions. A quantitative study by Vucetic
(2011) points towards a limited impact of trade with the US on a decision to join
a war coalition, in addition he finds no evidence that US aid could exert a similar
impact. This finding is rather unexpected given the anecdotal evidence and the
broad agreement in the aid literature that foreign assistance tends to be conditioned
on donors’ strategic considerations (buying policy concessions) rather than the
recipients’ needs; a tendency particularly pronounced since the War on Terror
(Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2008, Fleck and Kilby, 2010, Lis, 2014). As
his focus was on political rather than economic variables, Vucetic (2011) does
not show if pre-war economic ties and their changes will have an impact on the
likelihood of joining a war coalition.
Our study aims to fill the existing gap in the literature and assess the role
economic ties - in form of international trade, foreign military and economic aid,
and additionally FDI - play in the process of forming war coalitions.
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3 Method
We assume that all countries other than the coalition leader and Iraq were can-
didates to join the US-led Multi-National Force – Iraq. We have data on FDI,
trade and aid for 115 countries, including 30 countries which sent troops to Iraq
over the period 2003 to 2009.1 We did not consider the last two years of the con-
flict (2010 and 2011) because only the United Kingdom remained as a coalition
member. Table 1 summarises the data sources used.
Table 1: Data sources
Measures of bilateral economic ties
Trade with the US (imports + exports) IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
US outward FDI flows Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and OECD
Economic and military aid U.S. Agency for International Development (2016)
Political variables and controls
GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators
Military expenditure SIPRI (2017)
UN voting agreement Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017)
US ally Gibler (2009)
Colonial relationship with US GeoDist, Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Distance to Iraq GeoDist, Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Level of Democracy Center for Systemic Peace (2016)
All economic ties variables and military expenditure are divided by the GDP
of the partner country.
Our dependent variable takes a value of one if a state contributed by sending
troops to the war in Iraq and zero otherwise. We employ a panel random effects
probit model to control for time-invariant country specific effects. We additionally
include year dummies to capture trends that are common to all partner countries
such as annual fluctuations in global conditions and/or changes in economic or
political environment in the US.2
1The countries included in the coalition are: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom. We
do not have data on nine other coalition members: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
Iceland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia and Tonga.
2Inclusion of time dummies also minimises the potential risk of cross-country correlation in
the errors.
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With respect to the explanatory variables, our main interest lies on measures
of economic ties with the US. Firstly, we hypothesise that states that have stronger
economic ties with the US prior to the war were more likely to contribute troops
to the war effort. We measure the intensity of economic ties with bilateral trade
flows, FDI inflows and foreign aid receipts from the US relative to the size of
receiving country’s GDP in year 2001. We choose 2001 as our reference period
because the flows in 2002 may have been affected by the preparation to the inva-
sion of Iraq and other campaigns in the War on Terror. Secondly, we would want
to include countries’ expectations of benefits in return for joining the war, which
will be shaped by negotiations with the US. Unfortunately, those expectations are
difficult to measure, as they tend to stay behind closed doors. However, we can
observe materialised changes in economic flows. Assuming that the US fulfilled
its promises, those actual flows can to some extent serve as a proxy of those ex-
pectations.3 Therefore, we introduce variables for measuring the difference in the
level of economic flows between the current and the reference year. These differ-
ences (“buying friends” variables) measure the responsiveness of states to changes
in the bilateral economic flows.
The choice of other control variables is dictated by findings of the studies
discussed in the previous section. Our covariates at the (i) system-level are the
share of a partner country’s military expenditure to its GDP, colonial ties and the
distance to Iraq; at the (ii) dyad-level are being a core English speaking country,
being a US ally4 and the degree of similarity to the US in the UN voting be-
haviour; at the (iii) state-level are GDP per capita and a democracy indicator; and
at the (iv) operation-level are dummies for capturing countries participating in the
Afghanistan war and for countries which were members of the former Warsaw
Pact. The last variable was added to capture countries which may have security
concerns towards Russia. With the exception of distance to Iraq, we expect all
other variables to show a positive relationship with the likelihood of joining the
war coalition.
3Admittedly, this is a strong assumption. However, to be a credible partner for future ventures,
it would be risky for the US not to fulfill its obligations.
4A dummy variable taking the value of one if a country was in a formal military alliance with
the US in a given year and zero otherwise.
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4 Results
Table 2 presents the results for the periods 2003 – 2009 and 2003 – 2006.5 The
second period was selected to show the impact of the covariates on the likelihood
to participate in the first half of the conflict as well as to avoid the period of the
financial crisis from 2007 onwards.
Table 2: RE Probit Results
Period 2003 – 2009 2003 – 2006
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Trade/GDP 2001 8.55 (5.53) 8.51* (5.00)
Trade/GDP Difference 18.80** (9.05) 25.36** (12.09)
FDI/GDP 2001 33.98 (46.18) 33.99 (31.78)
FDI/GDP Difference -12.05 (11.86) -14.30 (12.91)
Milit. Aid Oblig. 2001 -406.50 (575.16) 140.68 (517.47)
Milit. Aid Oblig./GDP Diff. -255.89 (239.48) -155.89 (262.64)
Econ. Aid Oblig. -72.52 (75.66) -70.79 (120.46)
Econ. Aid Oblig./GDP Diff. -249.27** (107.34) -248.93 (162.90)
GDP/Cap. in Thousands 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04)
Colony 6.48** (2.23) 3.63* (2.03)
UN Agreement 5.11 (6.72) 1.85 (6.65)
ISAF 7.73** (2.47) 7.29*** (2.15)
Level of Democracy 0.07 (0.13) 0.05 (0.12)
Military Exp./GDP 98.37** (38.19) 27.58 (48.75)
Warsaw Pact 12.68*** (2.28) 10.76*** (1.98)
Anglosphere 1.02 (3.13) -1.28 (2.37)
US Ally 2.33 (1.67) 2.51* (1.41)
Distance to Iraq (in km) 0.0007** (0.0003) 0.0004* (0.0002)
Constant -21.65*** (3.67) -16.07*** (3.27)
lnσ2ν 3.68 (0.31) 3.21 (0.36)
Observations 684 397
Time Dummies Yes Yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
5To check the robustness of results, six random effects panel probit regressions were estimated,
spanning over various years of the war duration, i.e. starting from the time period 2003 – 2009,
then 2003 – 2008 until 2003 – 2004 (see Table 3 in the Appendix).
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The results indicate that a high level of bilateral trade with the US before the
war was positively linked to the probability that a country would join the coalition.
Furthermore, increases in trade share of GDP from its reference pre-war level
also have a strongly significant positive association with the likelihood of being a
coalition member. This finding is in line with Vucetic (2011).
FDI and military aid do not appear to have played a role in the decision
whether to join the US-led coalition or not. Surprisingly, there is some indication
of a negative relationship between changes in economic aid and sending troops to
Iraq. This could be partly explained by the absence of African countries in Iraq,
which are significant aid recipients and often experience domestic economic and
security pressures of their own.
With respect to political drivers, we found evidence for the Warsaw Pact effect
– states that belonged to the Soviet-controlled bloc during the Cold War were sig-
nificantly more likely to join the Iraq war. This group constituted a large fraction
of the coalition membership and accounted for 15 of 39 countries with military
presence in Iraq. The Warsaw Pact effect is likely an attempt to mitigate risks
linked to past and present security challenges. Many of the former Eastern bloc
states that went to Iraq were intensively working on aligning themselves with the
West and escaping the Russian zone of influence.
The coefficients in Table 2 also reveal that countries that were part of the ISAF
task force in Afghanistan were more likely to join the Iraq war. As both campaigns
were framed as a part of the War on Terror, involvement in Iraq could have been
justified to the domestic electorate by arguing that this conflict was its continu-
ation. Furthermore, the experience of military collaboration with the US would
have facilitated the coordination and alignment of skills, experience and technol-
ogy. Further results confirm the importance of existing military alliances when
forming coalitions. The coefficient on distance to Iraq is positive and statistically
significant which contradicts our initial hyporthesis. This result can be explained
with the fact that none of the states from Iraq’s neighbourhood decided to send
troops to the country. This adds to the impression that participation in the war
effort was likely to be driven by factors other than shared, direct and near security
threats by coalition members.
Finally, we do not find sufficient evidence to confirm the importance of a coun-
try’s military expenditure as a share of GDP6 or that of being a member of the
Angloshphere in deciding whether to militarily assist the US in Iraq.
6Only in one out of six regressions we find a significant and positive impact of military expen-
diture. In shorter time panels this coefficient turns insignificant and negative.
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Overall, our results show that from the analysed types of economic flows only
bilateral trade relations were likely to have a significant positive impact on form-
ing the Iraq war coalition.
5 Conclusions
Our results suggest that the drivers of joining the US coalition were mainly of
political nature, e.g. countries responding to past and present security conditions.
From the economic ties variables, only bilateral trade with the US appeared to
be positively associated with the probability of joining the coalition. Both good
trade relations prior to the conflict and prospects of their further improvements ap-
peared to have increased the willingness of countries to join the coalition. Thus,
from the coalition leader’s perspective, maintaining good trade relations in peace
as well as conflict times appears to be the “buying friends” variable which may
help to ensure support for military campaigns from other countries. In spite of the
anecdotal evidence, there is no empirical evidence that the dependence on Amer-
ican FDI or aid affected countries’ decisions on the participation in the Iraq war.
Future research should consider the complementary side of the “buying friends”
puzzle and investigate whether participation in the war translated into increased
trade, investment or aid receipts between the US and the coalition members.
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